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TOO BIG TO JAIL: THE LACK OF SUITABLE
CULPABILITY ELEMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS
INTRODUCTION
Due to the presence of securities fraud and insider trading in the race to
gain informational advantages in securities markets, how is it possible to
deter these practices and prevent the rise of a lemons market?1 If there is a
public notion that there is no way to compete with these illicit schemes
through legitimate information gathering, then it makes the market less
attractive to the investing public. 2 In order to deter future practices of
securities fraud and insider trading, United States Attorney General Eric
Holder implemented a new enforcement program in 2010 called “Operation
Broken Trust.”3
Despite this gradual approach towards holding certain Wall Street
malfeasants accountable, few high profile cases have been successful. For
example, federal prosecutors fell short in their pursuit of Ralph R. Cioffi
and Matthew Tannin, two former hedge fund managers who were allegedly
responsible for Bear Sterns’ 2008 collapse.4 After this failed effort, United
States law enforcement had been hesitant to indict more members of Wall
Street,5 but the public outcry since the financial crisis6 has beckoned federal
law enforcement to rise to the challenge. Federal prosecutors have made a
renewed effort in response to this demand for accountability, having
1. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation,
55 DUKE L.J. 711, 762 n.192 (2006) (“A lemons market is a market in which asymmetric
information exists between sellers and buyers. Since the buyers are not fully informed as to the
quality of the products, they discount the price of all products.”).
2. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 24 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining how a lemons market can develop from a failure to make
honest disclosures, such as in securities fraud and insider trading schemes).
3. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pulling Back the Curtain on Fraud Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
6, 2010, 8:59 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/pulling-back-the-curtain-on-fraud-
inquiries/ (noting that Mr. Holder’s new task force has brought cases against 343 criminal
defendants and 189 civil defendants for fraud schemes resulting in over $8 billion in losses).
4. See U.S. v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Bear Stearns Trial: How
The Scapegoats Escaped, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009, 6:58 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/bearstearns-trial-how-the-scapegoats-escaped/.
5. Cf. SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (noting that
since 2009 the number of insider trading cases the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC) has brought has grown exponentially).
6. Neil Barofsky, a former federal prosecutor, has noted that the government should have
invested in more white-collar crime investigators to aid the growing need for investigations. See
Chris Arnold, After Five Years, Why So Few Charges In Financial Crisis?, NPR.ORG (July 26,
2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205866019/fewon-wall-street-have-been-
prosecuted-for-financial-crisis (“[t]he folks responsible for this incredibly painful economic
damage that struck our economy have gone free.”).
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indicted S.A.C. Capital for insider trading and securities fraud.7 Despite
United States Attorney Preet Bharara’s proclamation that he does not “think
anyone is too big to indict or jail,”8 S.A.C. Capital founder and chairman
Steven A. Cohen, escaped indictment while S.A.C. Capital and several of
its mid-level managers did not.9 Cohen was not indicted along with his
hedge fund despite federal prosecutor’s assertions that Cohen was “the fund
owner” who “encouraged” his employees to acquire insider information
despite its illegality.10
S.A.C. Capital’s federal indictment serves as a prime example of how
current federal securities law is relatively powerless to hold Wall Street
leaders like Cohen accountable for their misconduct in overseeing corporate
malfeasance.11 Specifically, the “knowledge” requirement of most federal
securities law creates a high evidentiary burden that is oftentimes difficult
to meet.12 Moreover, this lack of a threat of criminal liability for corporate
ringleaders such as Cohen reveals a more troubling absence of a deterrence
mechanism that will perpetuate if the current law is not reformed.13 For
example, Cohen has not ceased his risky spending14 in light of his hedge
7. See generally Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., et al., No.
13CR00541 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), 2013 WL 3829113.
8. See Maureen Farrell, Wall St. Sheriff: No One Too Big to Indict, CNN.COM (July 17, 2013,
12:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/17/investing/wall-street-usattorney-sac/index.html.
9. See Patricia Hurtado, et al., SAC Capital Indicted For Unprecedent Insider Trading Scam,
BLOOMBERG.COM (July 25, 2013, 5:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-25/sac-
capital-indicted-in-six-year-u-s-insider-probe.html.
10. Id.
11. Bharara has noted the dangers of financial entities with large amounts of capital and a
small moral compass. See Jeff Cox, No One is Too Big to Jail, Wall Street Cop Says, CNBC.COM
(July 17, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100892955 (“If you give people a blank
check and tell them they have a get-out-of-jail-free card because of their size . . . that’s a very
dangerous thing.”).
12. See generally Samuel W. Buell,What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511 (2011).
13. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pulling Back the Curtain on Fraud Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
6, 2010, 8:59 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/pulling-back-the-curtain-on-fraud-
inquiries/ (noting that in light of Operation Broken Trust, federal prosecutors have not brought
criminal charges against any corporate official, instead prosecuting small-time targets).
14. Not only did Cohen purchase a $155 million Picasso painting shortly after S.A.C. Capital’s
civil settlement, he also threw an extravagant party in the Hamptons days after S.A.C. Capital was
indicted. See Richard Vines & Katya Kazakina, Cohen Buys Picasso’s ‘Le Reve’ From Wynn for
$155 Million, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 26, 2013, 2:12 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-26/cohen-buys-picasso-from-wynn-for-155-million-
post-says.html; see also Matthew Goldstein, Steven Cohen Throws Party Despite His Fund’s
Indictment, REUTERS.COM (July 28, 2013, 3:58 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/28/us-sac-fund-party-idUSBRE96R0BQ20130728.
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fund shedding assets15 and despite settling a civil suit for a large sum of
money.16
This Note applies several alternative criminal doctrines and codes to
illustrate how federal securities law can be reformed to invoke a greater
threat of criminal liability to principals of companies that engage in
securities fraud and insider trading. These proposed alterations include
changing the statutory language of 78ff(a) and 78j of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to impose liability when a
principal, “willfully and knowingly or by deliberate avoidance makes, or
causes to be made,” any fraudulent securities exchanges. An exception
would be provided for principals who have no responsibility and authority
to prevent a violation of its agents and employees. This synthesis of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine and the willful blindness doctrine
lowers the current mens rea requirement and motivates principals to adhere
to federal guidelines.
Part I of this Note will first discuss the U.S. Attorneys Office’s
development of its prosecution against S.A.C. Capital. Part II will analyze
the jurisprudence of federal securities law, with specific attention to the
statutory and deterrence limitations of current federal securities law to
explain the difficulty of indicting Cohen. Part III will analyze Cohen’s
conduct if he were subject to the responsible corporate officer doctrine,
including the potential benefits and criticisms if it were incorporated into
federal law. Part IV will investigate whether the willful blindness doctrine
offers a more practical solution to principal criminal liability, addressing
both its proponents and detractors. Part V will conclude that an adoption of
an industry specific securities law involving a synthesis of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine and the statutory language of the willful blindness
doctrine will serve as an effective deterrent, imposing a larger threat of
criminal liability on principals and attenuating the zeitgeist for
accountability on Wall Street.
I. BACKGROUND OF STEVEN COHEN AND S.A.C. CAPITAL’S
INDICTMENT
The hedge fund, formerly known as S.A.C. Capital,17 is a group of fund
management companies18 that are owned by Cohen. Cohen has a net worth
15. See Saijel Kishan, SAC Shrinks U.S. Stock Holdings by $2 Billion Amid Probe,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 15, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-15/sac-
shrinks-u-s-stock-holdings-by-2-billion-amid-probe.html.
16. S.A.C. Capital recently settled with the SEC for $616 million. See Peter Lattman, SAC
Capital to Pay $616 Million in Insider Trading Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013, 1:58 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/sac-settles-insider-trading-cases-for-616-million/.
17. The moniker S.A.C. Capital represents the collective affiliated hedge funds operated by
Cohen. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, para. 2. The hedge fund operated as a pool of numerous
individual portfolios respectively handled by a portfolio manager responsible for the profit or loss
of their portfolio. Id. para. 8. After settling his hedge fund’s criminal charges, Cohen renamed the
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of $10.3 billion,19 is currently number 121 on the Forbes’ 400 Richest
People in America, 20 and is the fifth richest American hedge fund
manager.21 Aside from being the owner, Cohen founded S.A.C. Capital in
1992.22 Cohen serves the company as the CEO and Managing Director,
whose offices are based in New York, New York and Stamford,
Connecticut. 23 Through these entities, Cohen has produced a very
successful operation using a “mosaic theory of investing,24 earning him as
much as $585 million in 2011. 25 While many critics have questioned
whether this trading strategy constitutes insider trading,26 the practice is
considered by others as “perfectly legitimate and it is encouraged.”27
S.A.C. Capital’s success has not come without certain consequences. In
April 2013, S.A.C. Capital settled a $602 million insider trading scheme
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).28 The SEC’s
entities Point 72 Asset Management. See Saijel Kishan & Kelly Bit, Cohen Changes SAC Name to
Point72 in Family Office Shift, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:40 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-11/sac-capital-to-rename-as-point72-asset-
management-memo-says.html.
18. The fund management companies served as investment advisors to S.A.C. Capital. The
companies, referred to by Bharara as the “SAC Entity Defendants”, include: CR Intrinsic
Investors, LLC (CR Intrinsic), Sigma Capital Management, LLC (Sigma Capital), S.A.C. Capital
Advisors, LLC, (S.A.C. Capital LLC), S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. (S.A.C. Capital LP). Id. para.
3.
19. See Steve Cohen, FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/profile/steve-cohen/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2014).
20. Id.
21. See 2013 400 Richest Americans—Hedge Fund Managers, FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eilm45fijj/5-steve-cohen/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
22. See Company Overview of S.A.C. Capital Management, LLC, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Sept.
29, 2013, 4:42 PM),
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/people.asp?privcapId=1527066.
23. Id.
24. Mosaic theory is “the analysis of public and nonmaterial nonpublic information as the
basis for investment recommendations and decisions even if those conclusions would have been
material inside information had they been communicated directly to the analyst by a company.”
INTEGRITY RESEARCH ASSOCS., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE HANDBOOK 51 (10th ed.
2010), available at
http://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/products/publications/ccb/Pages/ccb.v2010.n2.1.aspx.
25. Cohen keeps fifty percent of the profit his hedge fund earns. See Julie Creswell & Azam
Ahmed, Large Hedge Funds Fared Well in 2011, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2012, 11:00 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/large-hedge-funds-fared-well-in-2011/.
26. Many critics question the “materiality” of the nonpublic information that “mosaic theory”
traders acquire. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Just Tidbits, or Material Facts for Insider Trading?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/just-tidbits-or-
material-facts-for-insider-trading/?_r=0.
27. It is argued that “each individual piece of information is nonmaterial by itself . . . [t]aken
together, however, the bits of information can form a meaningful mosaic.” See INTEGRITY
RESEARCH ASSOCS., CFA LEVEL I ETHICS AND STANDARDS, available at
http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/ethics-standards/standard-nonpublic-
information.asp.
28. See Bob Van Voris, SAC’s Record $602 Million SEC Settlement Approved,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 16, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-16/sac-s-
record-602-million-sec-settlement-approved.html.
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claim asserted that former S.A.C. Capital portfolio manager Mathew
Martoma provided illegal tips about Alzheimer’s medication to both CR
Intrinsic and S.A.C. Capital, resulting in $276 million of illegal profit and
the avoidance of losses on shares with Elan Corporation, plc and the former
pharmaceutical company, Wyeth. 29 Although the allegation claims that
Martoma shared this information with Cohen,30 he was not charged or sued
by the SEC.31 While Cohen and his hedge fund appeared to have escaped
the SEC’s civil claim with a small fee, criminal charges and public
notoriety were on the horizon.
On July 23, 2013, United States Attorney Preet Bharara indicted S.A.C.
Capital, its entities, and seven former SAC employees on one count of wire
fraud32 and four counts of securities fraud.33 The indictment charged S.A.C.
Capital and its subsidiaries as being criminally responsible for its
employees’ insider trading offenses, asserting that this scheme was “made
possible by institutional practices that encouraged the widespread
solicitation and use of illegal inside information.”34 The touchstone of the
indictment was S.A.C. Capital’s alleged “institutional indifference” 35 to
insider trading that was “without known precedent in the hedge fund
industry.”36 Specifically, the allegations asserted that S.A.C. Capital and its
management firms pursued the hiring of portfolio managers (PMs) and
research analysts (RAs) 37 who had “proven access to public company
contacts likely to possess [i]nside [i]nformation.”38 Further, it is claimed
that S.A.C. Capital “failed to employ effective compliance procedures or
practices” in order to deter its PMs and RAs from committing insider
trading.39
With respect to the insider trading scheme, Bharara asserted that S.A.C.
Capital’s employees were given financial incentives to recommend to
29. See generally Complaint, SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, et al., No. 12 CV 8466 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-237.pdf.
30. Cohen is anonymously referred to in the complaint as “Portfolio Manager A”. See
generally id. at 5.
31. While Cohen denied any misconduct, Martoma pleaded not guilty. Van Voris, supra note
28.
32. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, paras. 35–43.
33. Id. paras. 36–43 (alleging that S.A.C. Capital and its management firms allegedly “did use
and employ manipulative and deceptive devices and contrivances” in connection with the
purchase and sale of securities.); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012); 15 U.S.C § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.10b-5 & 240.10b5 (1951).
34. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, para. 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. para. 5. Throughout the indictment, Bharara refers to these positions as “SAC PMs”
and “SAC RAs”.
38. Id. para. 6.
39. Id.
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Cohen40 “high conviction” trading ideas that would give these portfolio
managers an “edge” over other investors.41 Furthermore, Cohen and S.A.C.
Capital repeatedly failed to question the PMs’ trading proposals, even if
they “appeared to be based on [i]nsider [i]nformation.”42 In turn, Bharara
asserted that the collective practices of S.A.C. Capital and Cohen “fostered
a business culture . . . in which there is no meaningful commitment to
ensure that such ‘edge’ came from legitimate research and not [i]nside
[i]nformation.” 43 These illegal practices had the effect of “hundred of
millions of dollars in illegal profits and avoided losses at the expense of the
members of the investing public.”44
According to the indictment, the individual defendants—Wes Wang,
Richard Choo-Beng Lee,45 Jon Horvath, Noah Freeman, Donald Longueuil,
Mathew Martoma, and Richard Lee46—were indicted on respective charges
of wire fraud. 47 Of these seven defendants, only Jon Horvath, Mathew
Martoma, and CB Lee had contact with Cohen relating to their respective
insider trading charges.48
As established by the indictment, Cohen and S.A.C. Capital put an
emphasis on hiring PMs and RAs that had an “edge” based partially on their
“company contacts in their respective sectors,” 49 with no compliance
measure to prevent these candidates from using their contacts to acquire
non-public, material information. 50 After S.A.C. Capital approved
prospective SAC PMs and RAs for hiring, it conducted a due diligence
review. 51 For example, the due diligence report for Jon Horvath
characterized his company contacts as a “key strength” in which he
“min[ed] his industry contact network for datapoints.”52 Similarly, Mathew
Martoma’s due diligence report noted his health care “industry contacts
40. Id. para. 2. While Cohen was not indicted, the moniker “SAC Owner” is used throughout
the indictment to describe his presence during the timeline of these charges.
41. Id. para. 6. The term “edge” is used throughout the indictment to suggest the presence of
insider information.
42. Id.
43. Id. para. 7.
44. Id.
45. Richard Choo-Beng Lee is referenced at all relevant times in the document as “CB Lee.”
Id. para. 14b.
46. This Note will only discuss four of the individual defendants—Jon Horvath, CB Lee,
Mathew Martoma and Richard Lee (R. Lee)—and their insider trading schemes as they concern
some involvement of Cohen.
47. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, para. 14.
48. These are the only three defendants in which the “SAC Owner” was referred to with
respect to their allegations. In relation to R. Lee, Cohen had no alleged contact but did play a role
in his hiring. See generally id.
49. Id. para. 17.
50. Id. para. 16.
51. Id. para. 18. This included “interviewing the candidate’s references, prior employers and
others, in part to identify the strength of the candidate’s industry contact networks.”
52. Id.
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beyond management” and a personal “network of doctors in the field.”53
The indictment emphasized that neither Horvath’s nor Martoma’s reports
included any reference to the probability that he would have or had actually
used insider contacts to make impermissible trades on behalf of S.A.C.
Capital. 54 In one instance, S.A.C. Capital hired a candidate who had a
history of insider trading—R. Lee. In particular, Cohen received a warning
from one of R. Lee’s coworkers that R. Lee was known for being part of the
hedge fund’s “insider trading group.”55 Despite further caution expressed by
S.A.C. Capital’s legal department, Cohen proceeded to hire R. Lee.56
Among the insider trading charges made against S.A.C. Capital and its
individual defendants, the contents of the allegation reflect that Cohen had
contact with Horvath, Martoma, and CB Lee in connection with their
misconduct. 57 These defendants, and how their misconduct relates to
Cohen, will be discussed in turn.
A. HORVATH
Jon Horvath, employed by Sigma Capital from 2006 to 2011, was an
SAC RA who specialized in technology.58 On August 18, 2008, Horvath
gained information from an insider at Dell that the company’s earnings
would be below market expectations.59 Horvath relayed this information to
his portfolio manager Michael Steinberg,60 and in turn he shorted shares of
Dell stock in Steinberg’s portfolio.61 On August 26, 2008, Steinberg relayed
to Horvath that Cohen wanted Horvath to discuss his Dell information with
a different SAC PM who had a contrarian view of Dell’s financial
position.62 About an hour later, Horvath responded in an email to both
Steinberg and the bullish SAC PM that he had a contact at Dell who
verified his pessimistic view of the company’s future performance, noting
53. Id.
54. Id. Prosecutors emphasized that the due diligence reports made no reference to their
“ethics, integrity, compliance or whether [they] had or was likely to use the referenced contacts to
obtain or make trades based on [i]nsider [i]nformation.”
55. Id. para. 19.
56. Id.
57. See generally id.
58. On September 28, 2012, Horvath pled guilty to charges of conspiracy and securities fraud
for insider trading he committed while at Sigma Capital. These charges came in connection with
insider trading with respect to Dell Inc. in August 2008 and NVIDIA Corporation in May 2009, in
which Horvath obtained and provided inside information about these companies to Steinberg, who
initiated subsequent trades. Id. para. 14c.
59. Id. para. 32a.
60. Mr. Steinberg also received an indictment in this case, but his relevance to this Note is as
an intermediary between Horvath and Cohen. Id. para. 14c.
61. Id. para. 32a.
62. Id.
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to keep this revelation secret.63 The email also noted that the gross margin
for Dell would fall short by “50-80 bps [basis points].”64 This email was
forwarded to Cohen’s research trader who assisted him in trading
technology stock. The trader then called Cohen and forwarded the email to
him personally.65 As a result, Cohen began selling the Dell shares in his
portfolio, closing out his entire $12.5 million position and avoiding losses
of about $1.7 million.66 Two days later, Dell publicly announced earnings
that aligned with Horvath’s tip of below market expectations.67 For his
gratitude to his employees, Cohen emailed Steinberg’s group, including
Horvath stating, “[n]ice job on [D]ell.”68
B.MARTOMA
Mathew Martoma, employed by CR Intrinsic from 2006 to 2010, was a
SAC PM specializing in health care. 69 On April 11–12, 2008, Cohen
exchanged emails with two CR Intrinsic health care analysts about
information70 regarding an Alzheimer’s disease drug trial being run by Elan
and Wyeth.71 After a series of follow-ups regarding the clinical investigator
at the drug trial, both analysts opined to Cohen that it ‘“was possible but
unlikely”’ that the ‘“final data”’ would be statistically significant.72 Not
only did Cohen fail to question the CR Intrinsic analysts paid consultation
for the information about the non-public drug trial data, he directed
Martoma to substantiate the information presented by the clinical
investigator.73 On July 17, 2008, Martoma allegedly acquired “negative
63. Id. Specifically, Martoma stated he had “a 2nd hand read from someone at the company—
this is 3rd quarter I have gotten this read from them and it has been very good in the last two
quarters. . . . Please keep to yourself as obviously not well known.”
64. Id.
65. Id. paras. 29, 32a.
66. Id. paras. 29–30, 32a.
67. Id. paras. 30, 32a.
68. Id.
69. Id. paras. 11, 14f. On December 21, 2012, a grand jury indicted Martoma, charging him
with insider trading with respect to shares of Elan Corporation, plc and Wyeth.
70. These two analysts, referred to in the indictment as “Analyst 1” and “Analyst 2” obtained
information about this trial through a paid consultation with a clinical investigator. Id. paras. 18,
21d.
71. As of July 2008, S.A.C. Capital owned over $700 million worth of Elan American
Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) and Wyeth common stock, which was the hedge fund’s largest
position in equity securities. Id. paras. 27, 31a.
72. The analysts further concluded that it was not “unreasonable” to believe that the clinical
investigator was amongst a “small # of ppl [who] have seen the [Drug Trial] data.” Id. paras. 19,
21d.
73. Cohen clearly recognized Martoma’s strength in the health care sector, noting that it
“seems like Mat [Martoma] has a lot of good relationships in this arena” when discussing the drug
trial with the two CR Intrinsic analysts. Id. para. 21e. In addition, the CR Intrinsic analysts
complained in emails with each other that Martoma was “telling ppl he has black edge”—a phrase
the indictment asserts is “[i]nside [i]nformation – with respect to the outcome of the Drug Trial.”
Id.
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[i]nside [i]nformation” from a doctor involved with the drug trial connected
to the business of Elan and Wyeth.74 On July 19, 2008, Martoma went to
Michigan to meet with the doctor personally.75 The next day, Martoma
called Cohen, who in turn began selling the fund’s cumulative $700 million
position in Elan and Wyeth, shorting about $260 million worth of stock.76
This action was taken about a week before the public announcement of the
drug trial results.77 As a result of Martoma’s tip and the subsequent trade,
S.A.C. Capital profits and avoided losses from this insider trading scheme
totaled about $276 million.78
C. LEE
CB Lee, employed by S.A.C. Capital LLC from 1999 to 2003 and then
Sigma Capital from 2003 to 2004, was an SAC RA technology specialist.79
During his time at these two S.A.C. Capital entities, CB Lee provided
illegal insider tips to both his SAC PM and Cohen.80 The indictment asserts
that with respect to traders like CB Lee, Cohen failed to inquire about
candidates “who at minimum implied that their ‘edge’ was based on sources
of [i]nside [i]nformation.”81 Consistent with his business practices dating
back to when he worked for Sigma Capital in 2004,82 CB Lee provided tips
to people at Sigma Capital on January 16, 2009, noting that a “friend of
[his] cousin” who “work[ed] for Dell finance” told him “to avoid the stock
for Q2, because Q2 is gonna [sic] be horrible.”83 Although CB Lee no
longer worked for SAC Capital,84 he contacted Cohen as late as June 2009
regarding trading suggestions on particular companies, in return for any
profits made on the proposed tips.85 Specifically, CB Lee represented that
he knew sales and finance personnel at NVIDIA who “gave him
information relating to quarterly earnings.”86 It remains to be seen if Cohen
acted upon CB Lee’s offer.
74. Id. para. 31a.
75. Id.
76. Id. para. 31e.
77. Cohen allegedly made the trades on July 21, 2008. The public announcement of the drug
trial did not come until July 29, 2008. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. para. 14b.
80. CB Lee eventually pleaded guilty on October 13, 2009 to “conspiracy to commit securities
fraud and wire fraud relating to trading recommendations based on [i]nside [i]nformation” that he
provided to Sigma Capital during and after his tenure there. Id.
81. Id. para. 22.
82. When contacting either his SAC PM or Cohen, CB Lee would refer to his source of insider
information as “my guy,” “my contact,” or “my check” at the relevant company. Id. para. 34a.
83. Id. para. 32c.
84. By 2008, CB Lee was operating his own hedge fund. Id.
85. Id. para. 22.
86. While the allegations do not suggest what Cohen did with this information, it is reasonable
to infer that Cohen could have used CB Lee’s Sigma Capital tips, along with Horvath’s, to avoid
Dell’s below market expectations. Cf id. paras. 22, 32a. Even if Cohen did not act upon CB Lee’s
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While S.A.C. Capital is charged with “employ[ing] limited compliance
measures designed to prevent insider trading by SAC PMs or SAC RAs,”87
Cohen is alleged to have encouraged a policy of “not discussing [i]nside
information too openly, rather than not seeking or trading on such
information in the first place.”88 For example, an email communicated to
Cohen by a SAC PM at CR Intrinsic back on June 11, 2008 described why
a certain company contact did not go through with certain acquisitions.89 On
May 3, 2009, a second email from the same CR Intrinsic employee detailed
that he was “very comfortable that this qtr [sic] is going to be solid vs [sic]
current consensus and guidance” and that he was “getting coffee on tues
[sic] afternoon with the guy who runs north American generics business.”90
Cohen simply replied, “Let’s talk later.”91 In addition, on July 29, 2009, a
new SAC PM92 sent an instant message to Cohen, which detailed a tip he
received on Nokia stock.93 The PM further wrote that the head of S.A.C.
Capital’s compliance department “was giving [him] Rules 101 yesterday –
so [he] [wouldn’t] be saying much[.] [T]oo scary.”94 Cohen did not act on
or respond to this message or the contents therein.95
Despite Cohen’s connections to both the alleged culture of misconduct
and to various traders’ charges of insider trading, he was not formally
indicted.96 Even if Cohen has not faced any personal liability thus far, his
firm is subject to another hefty settlement with federal authorities; federal
prosecutors have recently proposed settling the criminal case for anywhere
between $1.5 billion to $2 billion.97 However, even if Cohen had to pay
both of these settlements out of his own pocket, he would still stand to walk
away a free man with a net worth around $7.7 billion.98
contacts, he “did not express any concern about CB Lee’s proposed sources of information during
these conversations.” Id. para. 22.
87. Id. para. 24.
88. Id. para. 23.
89. Id. para. 21a.
90. Id.
91. If anything, this evidence demonstrates Cohen’s adherence to minimal discussion of
insider information. Cf. id.




96. Similar to S.A.C. Capital’s civil case, Cohen has denied any wrongdoing in response to the
criminal indictment of his firm. See Paul M. Barrett, Targeting SAC: When Prosecutors Charge
Companies with Crimes, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (July 26, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-07-26/targeting-sac-when-prosecutors-charge-
companies-with-crimes.
97. S.A.C. Capital, which currently holds about $10 billion in assets, would stand to lose up to
$2.6 billion with the proposed criminal settlement and the previously settled civil case with the
SEC. Michael Rothfeld et al., Prosecutors Pursue Big SAC Settlement, WALL ST. J.COM (Sept. 25,
2013), http://stream.wsj.com/story/markets/SS-2-5/SS-2-336611/.
98. Forbes notes that Cohen’s net worth remains at $10.3 billion. See Steve Cohen,
FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/profile/steve-cohen/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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II. JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
In order to determine why Cohen was not indicted, it is necessary to
examine the relevant statutory charges that were brought against the S.A.C.
Capital entities and the four relevant individuals who were connected to
Cohen. While the indictment includes five total counts, the majority of the
alleged insider-trading scheme pertains to the one count of wire fraud.99 A
principal can be held liable under Title 18 of the United States Code—
including wire fraud100 —when they commit or aid and abet the commission
of an offense.101 Wire fraud is codified under section 1343 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. An individual who commits wire fraud “devise[s] or
intend[s] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means
of wire . . . in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings . . . for the
purpose of executing such scheme.” 102 Therefore, the government must
prove that there was (1) a scheme to defraud, involving (2) money or
property, and (3) the use of interstate wires to further that scheme.103 While
this charge seems reasonable to prove against individuals like Jon Horvath,
CB Lee, Mathew Martoma, and R. Lee, Cohen’s case is more tenuous. It
may appear that Cohen was involved in the insider trading schemes of these
individual defendants, but it is difficult to see how his conduct reflects that
he “devised . . . [a] scheme . . . for obtaining money . . . by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses [and] representations.”104 The indictment reflects
that the individual defendants were directly involved in acquiring insider
information and making trades based on that information.105 Conversely,
Cohen’s alleged hiring practices and email conversations with employees
do not provide enough evidence that he purposefully devised an insider
trading scheme.106 In fact, Cohen had the research traders responsible for
his portfolios execute the illicit trades.107 In addition, the relevant SEC
violations also use direct language for the commission of the offense, which
would appear to limit any vicarious liability to be imposed on Cohen.108
99. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, paras. 1–35.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
101. Id. § 2.
102. Id. § 1343.
103. See United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 726 F. Supp. 1424, 1434–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
see also United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208, 1216 (2d Cir. 1994) (establishing similar
elements for the federal mail fraud statute).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
105. See generally Sealed Indictment, supra note 7.
106. Id. para. 21a.
107. Id. para. 32a.
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012) (requiring that one “willfully and knowingly makes, or
causes to be made,” any statement to be filed with respect to securities exchanges); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78j (requiring that one directly “effect[s] a short sale” or “stop-loss order” or uses “any
manipulative or deceptive device[s]” with the purchase or sale of a security).
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An examination of the theoretical distinctions of fraud suggests several
alarming statutory flaws. There are two conceptual schools under which
fraud has been developed—a morality-based concept and a victim-based
concept.109 Under the morality principle, “fraud requires that an actor seek
to deceive another.”110 The mens rea requirements are fairly strict,111 and
the requisite liability question evaluates both the actor’s culpability in
making a false representation and his or her objective in engaging in this
conduct. 112 Conversely, the victim-based principle focuses on the harm
suffered at the hands of the misconduct. This victim-based principle is
comparatively more flexible; it does not require an inquiry into the actor’s
intentions, but rather defines fraud as “negligent statements or conduct, or
perhaps even on duly careful but nonetheless harmful statements or
conduct.”113
Professor Samuel Buell argues that the problem with criminal securities
fraud involves disconnect between these two schools of thought.114 When
public officials like Bharara make statements that no actor “is too big to
indict, no one is too big to jail,”115 they appear to advocate the morality-
based theory of fraud. On the other hand, the statutes, rules, and doctrine of
securities fraud appear to align with the harm-based theory.116 Throughout
Buell’s argument, he suggests that the term core fraud is a morality-based
concept while misrepresentation is a victim-based concept. Core fraud is
“best conceived as requiring purposeful deception.”117 Purpose is required
under this account because it best captures an actor’s intention to deceive
another.118 Essentially, the deception is a mechanism used towards a goal,
and if that goal is not part of an actor’s mental state, no fraud exists.119
While misrepresentation is typically a tort, core fraud “require[s] everything
needed to establish a misrepresentation, plus . . . the actor’s level of mental
state, fault, culpability, or moral blameworthiness.” 120 In turn, the
commission of core fraud requires scienter.121 Thus, core fraud statutes,
109. Buell, supra note 12, at 515–16.
110. Id. at 515.
111. Id. Under this theory, “no such thing as no-fault fraud, negligent fraud, or arguably even
reckless fraud can exist.”
112. Id. at 515–16.
113. Naturally, this theory presents an array of legal actions. Id. at 516.
114. Or, as Buell puts it, the “duality and, at times, incoherence about the purpose and essence
of [] law.” Id. at 517.
115. Cox, supra note 11 (“If you give people a blank check and tell them they have a get-out-
of-jail-free card because of their size . . . that’s a very dangerous thing.”).
116. Buell, supra note 12, at 516.
117. Id. at 526.
118. Id. at 527.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 529.
121. Scienter is defined as knowledge or belief in the misrepresentation or the knowledge that
the actor does not have the basis for their representation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 526 (1977).
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which attempt to embody both goals and awareness, face a virtually
inevitable evidentiary problem—goals cannot be observed.122
The law of insider trading has further clouded the disarray surrounding
securities fraud. Essentially, insider trading is an example of non-disclosure
fraud.123 Conceptually, it has ties to both core fraud and misrepresentation.
If one has the goal to deceive when trading on an illegal tip, then he or she
is defrauding the respective counterparty; if one is reckless as to whether he
or she is trading on insider information, then it is more like
misrepresentation. 124 While the wire fraud statute that codifies insider
trading appears to meet the purposeful aspect of core fraud, the mental state
of an actor is not always apparent. In easy cases of insider trading, the
mental state is implicit in the actor’s conduct.125 This appears to be why
individual defendants such as Horvath, CB Lee, Martoma, and R. Lee were
easily indicted; each gained insider information on which he made trades in
his respective portfolio(s). The evidentiary burden is more difficult in novel
forms of deception, specifically intricate insider trading schemes.
Awareness of misconduct can typically be established only by evidence that
the actor tried to cover up the scheme or tried to prevent others from seeing
the true nature of his or her conduct.126 In light of this statutory inflexibility,
actors like Cohen may have systematically removed themselves so as to
render “the definition as faulty and under inclusive.”127
If federal law enforcement seeks to reconcile its moral basis for fraud
with federal securities law, then statutory reconstruction must focus on
“specify[ing] the conditions of fault and harm that make[s] imprisonment
and other forms of criminal punishment available.”128 In turn, “[a] regime
centered on culpability and blameworthiness—in its focus on responsibility
for acts of deception—is likely to require not only some scienter but a high
level of awareness.”129 To date, wire fraud has at least done an adequate job
in identifying what the actor’s goal is in using this deceptive practice.130
However, an appropriate definition of the requisite culpability for fraud is
not an easy feat; a restrictive definition can fail to capture the ever-evolving
122. Buell, supra note 12, at 532.
123. An actor defrauds the other party in a trade by failing to disclose that they had non-public,
material information. Id. at 562.
124. Id. at 564.
125. Id. at 539.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 520.
128. Id. at 519.
129. Id. at 534.
130. The statute, which recognizes that actors devise a scheme of fraud to obtain money or
property, appears to encapsulate the purpose of insider trading. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012); see also
Buell, supra note 12, at 563 (“[t]he seller/buyer defrauds her counterparty in a trade by not
disclosing that she has advantageous inside information—and that her decision to trade is based
on that information.”).
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concept of fraud whereas a flexible definition can be over-inclusive.131 The
issue that remains is what the appropriate culpability requirement would be
in order to counter the ingenuity of corporate wrongdoers.132
III. HISTORY, APPLICATION, AND EVALUATION OF THE
RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER (RCO) DOCTRINE
A. THEHISTORY OF THERCODOCTRINE IMPOSES LIABILITY ON
THOSE FOUND TO BE IN$RESPONSIBLERELATION# TO
CORPORATEMISCONDUCT
The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is a unique yet rarely
used mechanism in criminal law. The doctrine imposes vicarious liability
on a corporate officer for the criminal violation of his company or his
subordinates. Specifically, the doctrine attaches when the corporate officer
has maintained a position of responsibility and authority within the
corporation and by means of that position, had the power to prevent the
violation and failed to do so.133 Most notably, the doctrine imposes liability
upon officers for the illegal activity of their subordinates, without any proof
that the officers were directly involved in or authorized the commission of
the offense.134 In light of the RCO doctrine’s imputation of criminal intent,
its application has been limited to “public welfare offenses,” as it has been
traditionally applied to violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA).135
The Supreme Court first applied the RCO doctrine in United States v.
Dotterweich.136 Joseph Dotterweich was the president of Buffalo Pharmacal
Company, a supply chain distributer of drugs that had purchased drugs from
its manufacturers, repacked them under its own label and resold them in
interstate commerce.137 Dotterweich asserted that he did not know the drugs
were mislabeled.138 Both Dotterweich and his company were convicted for
violating Section 301(a) of the FDCA, a strict liability offense. 139 The
Second Circuit reversed the conviction, reasoning that Congress could not
have intended Section 301(a) to apply to individuals like Dotterweich,
131. Buell, supra note 12, at 520–21.
132. Id. at 531. Available mental states include knowledge, willful blindness, recklessness,
gross negligence, negligence and strict liability.
133. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673–74 (1975).
134. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1343 (1984) (noting that Park and Dotterweich
imposed criminal liability upon officers who did not directly participate in the commission of the
offense).
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2012).
136. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
137. Id. at 278.
138. Id. at 286.
139. See 21 U.S.C. § 301(a); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
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pursuant to the “good faith” exception codified in Section 303(c).140 The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, noting that the statute’s foundation in
strict liability “dispensed with the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.”141
The Supreme Court explained its harsh decision by noting that the
“circumstances of modern industrialism” have left the public more
vulnerable to issues of life and health. 142 In the Supreme Court’s
recognition of this “larger good,” it justified the criminal prosecution of
“otherwise innocent” corporate officers like Dotterweich who are “in
responsible relation to a public danger.” 143 It was further opined that
Congress intended for this strict liability to be placed on “those who have at
least the opportunity to inform[] themselves” of such violations.144 Despite
the creation of this doctrine, the Supreme Court refused to define the class
of corporate officers that would be “in such a responsible relation.”145
The RCO doctrine and its imposition of strict liability on corporate
officers were reaffirmed in United States v. Park.146 In this case, a large
national food chain and its president, John Park, were found in violation of
Section 301(k) of the FDCA,147 resulting from a rodent infestation in the
company’s warehouses. 148 During trial, Park admitted that he was
responsible for providing sanitary conditions, but that it was one of many
company duties he assigned to “dependable subordinates.”149 Despite this
defense, the jury found Park guilty on all counts.150
The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction, noting that Dotterweich had
dispensed of the traditional element of “awareness of some wrongdoing,”
but that it had not removed the element of “wrongful action,” which is
required for due process.151 The Supreme Court in Park rejected the Fourth
Circuit’s decision that the government had the burden of establishing that
Park had engaged in “wrongful action.” 152 The Supreme Court found
precedent where liability was imposed not only to corporate officers who
engaged in misconduct, “but also to those who by virtue of their managerial
140. This “good faith” exception notes that if a product is received with a guaranty of innocence
from the seller, then that product is adulterated or misbranded. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278–80.
141. Id. at 281.
142. Id. at 280.
143. Id. at 281 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922)).
144. Id. at 284.
145. Id. at 285.
146. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671–72 (1975).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 660.
149. Id. at 664.
150. The jury was instructed to find Park liable if he had “a responsible relation to the situation,
even though he may not have participated personally . . . . even if he did not consciously do
wrong.” Id. at 665 n.9.
151. See United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
152. Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
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positions or other similar relation to the actor could be deemed responsible
for its commission.”153 In this respective class of precedent cases, where the
relevant statute dispensed with a “consciousness of wrongdoing,” an
omission or failure to act was considered sufficient to hold the responsible
corporate officer liable.154 In each of these cases, liability under the doctrine
was satisfied by the significance of the agent’s relationship to the
corporation, which granted the “power to prevent the act complained of.”155
Additionally, the Court noted that the reach of the FDCA and other strict
liability statutes imposes a duty not only to remedy such violations but also
to implement business practices to prevent their occurrence.156
In affirming Park’s conviction, the Supreme Court articulated three
clear elements of liability under the RCO doctrine. A corporate officer will
be liable when (1) “by reason of his position in the corporation,” he had (2)
“responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of,” and (3) “failed to do
so.”157 Other than clarifying the RCO standard, the Supreme Court in Park
appeared to expand the reach of the doctrine; while Dotterweich was
closely involved in the operations of his small company,158 Park was the
president of a corporation with approximately 36,000 employees and 874
retail outlets, exercising his control through subordinates.159 Despite the
reach of the RCO doctrine to officers in companies of varying sizes and
aspects of control, it has been applied only to a limited group of “public
welfare” offenses.160
B. THEAPPLICATION OF THERCODOCTRINE TO FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW ISNOTWITHOUTDOCTRINAL AND
PRACTICALCONFLICTS
If current federal securities law were adapted to reflect the elements of
the RCO doctrine, it would be easier to indict and potentially prosecute
153. Id. at 670.
154. Id. at 671.
155. Id. (citing State v. Burnham, 128 P. 218 (1912); Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 275
P. 924 (1904); Cf. Groff v. State, 85 N.E. 769 (1908); Turner v. State, S.W.2d 236 (1937); People
v. Schwartz, 70 P.2d 1017 (1937); Francis Bowe Sayer, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of
Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930)).
156. Id. at 671–72.
157. Id. at 673–74.
158. See United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co. Inc., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (1942) (noting that
Dotterweich was in charge of the general business and instructed his employees to fill orders from
physicians).
159. Park, 421 U.S. at 660.
160. The Supreme Court in Dotterweich appeared to limit the application of the RCO doctrine
to those with “responsible relation to a public danger.” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 281 (1943) (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922)); see, e.g., United States
v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 51–52 (1st Cir. 1991) (concluding that the
RCO doctrine should be restricted to “public welfare statutes and regulations” lacking mens rea
requirements).
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corporate principals such as Cohen. In the omission of “awareness of some
wrongdoing” and “wrongful action,” as championed by Dotterweich and
Park, federal prosecutors would be able to reach corporate principals like
Cohen if the officers’ inaction in preventing the securities law violations
was within their “position in the corporation, responsibility, and
authority.”161
Although federal prosecutors in United States v. S.A.C. Capital
Advisors, L.P., et al did not indict Cohen, there is sufficient evidence in the
complaint that would result in criminal liability under the RCO doctrine,
due to Cohen’s inaction in preventing his hedge fund and his employees
from partaking in this insider-trading scheme. Under the RCO doctrine,
Cohen would be held liable if “by reason of his position in the corporation,”
he had “responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of,” and “failed to do so.”162
As previously noted, Cohen is the owner and founder of S.A.C. Capital,
now called Point72 Asset Management.163 He serves the company as the
CEO and Managing Director.164 With respect to the operation of the hedge
fund, Cohen allocated investment capital among approximately 100 internal
portfolios, each which was managed by an SAC PM.165 Moreover, Cohen
himself had sole trading discretion over his own portfolio, the largest one in
the entire company.166 Finally, Cohen required each SAC PM to disclose to
him “high conviction” trading ideas—that is, the investment
recommendations that the respective PM had great confidence in.167
Due to Cohen’s aspect of control over the operation of the internal
portfolios and his requirement that SAC PMs share “high conviction”
trading ideas, it is clear he had the “responsibility and authority” to prevent
any securities fraud or insider trading violations by his employees.
Additionally, the insider trading schemes involving Dell and Wyeth stock
shows that Cohen failed to act when his PMs had information that appeared
to be non-public and material. With respect to the Dell trade, Horvath sent
an email to Cohen that appeared to hint that the email was both non-public
and material.168 Not only did Cohen refuse to question Horvath about his
contact, he sold his entire $12.5 million Dell portfolio within ten minutes of
seeing the email, avoiding losses of about $1.7 million. 169 Rather than
question Horvath’s means of acquiring this information, Cohen emailed
161. Park, 421 U.S. at 672–74.
162. Id. at 673–74.
163. Company Overview of S.A.C. Capital Management, LLC, supra note 22.
164. Id.
165. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, para. 9.
166. Id. para. 11.
167. Id.
168. Horvath made sure to note in his email to Steinberg, which was forwarded to Cohen, that
the information should be “ke[pt] to yourself as obviously [its] not well known.” Id. para. 32a.
169. Id. paras. 21b, 32a.
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Steinberg and Horvath stating, “[n]ice job on [D]ell.”170 Moreover, when
Cohen avoided losses by shorting $260 million worth of Wyeth and Elan
stock, 171 he never asked his two RAs or Martoma if the information
suggesting that the Alzheimer drug trial would fail was acquired legally.172
Instead, he chose to trust confidential information and the benefits his
hedge fund received as a result.173
While the RCO doctrine appears to have the benefit of reaching Cohen
due to his “position in the corporation, responsibility, and authority,” there
are several doctrinal inconsistencies that question its effectiveness and
fairness. First, if federal securities law were to follow the concepts
championed by the Supreme Court in Dotterweich and Park, then hedge
fund managers and other principals of large corporations would have “a
positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur” and more
importantly, a “duty to implement measures that will ensure violations will
not occur.”174 As noted by William Buell, there are many difficulties in
identifying the duty to disclose in insider trading law, as “a duty to disclose
all informational advantages before trading would sweep too broadly.”175
This rationale has also been supported in Chiarella v. United States, in
which the Supreme Court reversed the insider trading conviction of an
employee of a financial printer, noting that one who used information
acquired at work to purchase stock had a duty to disclose to the market as a
whole. 176 If the application of the RCO doctrine were to require these
immense duties to prevent insider trading violations, then principals such as
Cohen would have to publicly disclose all information used to make trades.
This would seem to interfere with rewarding those diligent traders who
should be encouraged and rewarded in their efforts to legally acquire
beneficial information.177
Second, the penalties associated with federal securities law are not
compatible with the penalties justified under the traditional RCO doctrine
cases. As evinced by the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, the
justification for the omission of misconduct and knowledge under the RCO
doctrine is that the penalties for public welfare crimes “commonly are
relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s
reputation.” 178 This notion is consistent with the penalties imposed in
Dotterweich, Park, and Morissette. In Dotterweich, the plaintiff was
170. Id. para. 32a.
171. Id. para. 31a.
172. See supra note 70.
173. Id.
174. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
175. Buell, supra note 12, at 562.
176. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231–33 (1980).
177. As Buell notes, “[t]here is not, and should not be, a right of equal knowledge in securities
markets . . . .” Buell, supra note 12, at 562.
178. SeeMorissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
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convicted for shipping “adulterated and misbranded” drugs, which is a
misdemeanor, resulting in imprisonment for no longer than one year and a
$1,000 fine.179 In Park, the plaintiff was found guilty for five counts under
331(k) of the FDCA, resulting in a $50 fine for each count.180 In Morissette,
the plaintiff, in stealing government property, was subject either to two
months imprisonment or a $200 fine.181 Unlike the penalties imposed in
these cases, the counts cited in S.A.C. Capital’s indictment are far graver.
For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the penalties include a fine or
imprisonment for up to twenty years, or both.182 If criminal penalties for
insider trading and securities law violations are reserved for serious forms
of wrongdoing, then the law needs to “specify the conditions of fault and
harm that make imprisonment and other forms of criminal punishment
available.”183 As the RCO doctrine stands, simply punishing an officer for
their “position in the corporation, responsibility, and authority” would fail
to show why their conduct is more reprehensible than someone who
intended to let insider trading occur, as opposed to failing to act in
preventing the misconduct. Moreover, since the RCO doctrine is invoked in
circumstances under which there is a threat to public health and welfare,
insider trading and securities law violations fail to posit such a sweeping
form of harm on victims of these schemes.184 Due to these aforementioned
doctrinal inconsistencies, it seems unlikely that such an encapsulating strict-
liability provision like the RCO doctrine could be feasibly incorporated and
accepted into federal securities and insider trading law.
IV. HISTORY, APPLICATION, AND EVALUATION OF THE
WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE
A. THEHISTORY OF THE$WILLFUL BLINDNESS# DOCTRINE
IMPUTESKNOWLEDGEWHEREONE$DELIBERATELYAVOIDS
#KNOWLEDGE OFMISCONDUCT
The “willful blindness” standard, known in some circuits as “conscious
avoidance,” is a jury instruction that is used in federal fraud prosecutions.
The two leading cases that use this jury instruction are United States v.
Svoboda in the Second Circuit185 and United States v. Jewell in the Ninth
179. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a)(1) (2012).
180. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(k), 333(a)–(b).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
183. Buell, supra note 12, at 519.
184. Buell questions how much and what kind of harm is sufficient to make a fraud case “really
criminal.” Id. at 538 n.78 (critiquing the 2010 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual’s dollars lost to
the victim metric as “crude.”).
185. See U.S. v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. summarily denied, U.S. v. Robles,
541 U.S. 1044 (2004).
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Circuit.186 In Svoboda, Michael Robles and his friend Richard Svoboda
were charged with engaging “in a conspiracy to commit securities and
tender offer fraud” that occurred between November 1994 and December
1997.187 During that time, Svododa was a “credit policy officer[] at Nations
Bank[,]” who was responsible for structuring and approving corporate loans
to clients.188 Within the scope of his employment, Svodoba was “privy to
confidential information” about certain securities and tender offers of
Nation Bank’s clients. 189 In turn, Svodoba relayed this confidential
information to Robles, who made trades based on these tips and shared the
profits with Svodoba.190 While Svodoba reached a plea deal and testified
that Robles knew the information was illegal, Robles denied any knowledge
of the illegality of the source material. 191 Since Robles was being
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 371, three essential elements needed to be
proven: (1) an agreement among two or more people; (2) the defendant’s
knowing and willful joinder in that conspiracy; and (3) commission of an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by at least one of the alleged co-
conspirators.192
In analyzing these elements, the Second Circuit introduced the
“conscious avoidance doctrine,” in which “a defendant’s knowledge of a
fact required to prove the defendant’s guilt may be found when the jury ‘is
persuaded that the defendant consciously avoided learning that fact while
aware of a high probability of its existence.’”193 Additionally, this jury
instruction “permits a finding of knowledge even where there is no
evidence that the defendant possessed actual knowledge.”194 In attacking
the “conscious avoidance” jury instruction, Robles noted a prior decision
that stated that the Second Circuit “do[es] not permit the doctrine to be used
to prove intent to participate in the conspiracy.” 195 The Second Circuit
rejected this contention, noting that if intent to participate could not be
proven by the doctrine with respect to one conspirator, then the necessary
proof of intent to participate by at least two conspirators would be
lacking.196 In affirming the District Court’s “conscious of avoidance” jury
instruction, the Second Circuit noted that there was “no reason why the
factfinder may not rely on conscious avoidance to satisfy at least the
186. See U.S. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).





192. Id. at 476 (referencing United States v. Pickney, 85 F.3d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1996)) (citation
omitted).
193. Id. at 477 (citing United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 239 (2d Cir 2001)) (citation
omitted).
194. Id. at 477–78 (quoting United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000)).
195. Id. at 478 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 64 (2d Cir. 2002)).
196. Id.
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knowledge component of intent to participate in a conspiracy.” 197 In
dismissing Robles argument, the Second Circuit found that the District
Court did not err in the application of the “conscious avoidance”
instruction, which requires, “1) the defendant asserts the lack of some
specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction, . . . and 2) . . . the
evidence is such that . . . beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that [the defendant]
was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously
avoided confirming that fact[.]”198
In Jewell, the defendant appealed a conviction in which he entered the
United States driving a car that contained 110 pounds of marijuana worth
$6,250 that was hidden in a secret compartment between the trunk and rear
seat.199 During the appeal, the issue was how the knowledge requirement is
applied to 21 U.S.C. § 841, which is considered a “general intent crime.”200
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged precedent which stated that “the statute is
violated only if possession is accompanied both by knowledge of the nature
of the act and also by the intent ‘to manufacture, distribute, or dispense.’”201
During the course of the appeal, the defendant defined “knowingly” as
positive knowledge that a controlled substance is involved. 202 In turn,
defendant argued that although there was testimony that he knew about the
secret compartment, he did not know that there was a controlled substance
stored there, justifying his acquittal.203 While the District Court rejected the
defendant’s contention, and gave a jury instruction that knowledge could be
proven where, “his ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely the
result of his having made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that
which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth.”204 Despite defendant’s contentions that the statute required actual
knowledge, the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury instruction. The Jewell court
stated that, ‘“[d]eliberate ignorance’ instructions have been approved in
prosecutions under criminal statutes prohibiting ‘knowing’ conduct [in]
Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.”205 More specifically, the court
noted that by granting the defendant’s acquittal, they would go against two
circuits that have approved the “deliberate ignorance” instructions with
respect to 21 U.S.C. § 841.206 In concluding, the Ninth Circuit noted that
“deliberate ignorance” only differs from positive knowledge as it
197. Id. at 479.
198. Id. at 480 (quoting United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154) (citations omitted).
199. U.S. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1976).
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1973)).
202. See id.
203. Id. at 699.
204. Id. at 700.
205. Id. at 702.
206. Id. at 703.
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“encompasses a calculated effort to avoid the sanctions of the statute while
violating its substance.”207
B. THEAPPLICATIONOF THEWILLFUL BLINDNESSDOCTRINE
ENCOURAGESCREATIVECIRCUMVENTIONANDOVER-
DISCLOSURE
If lawmakers were to adopt a willful blindness or conscious avoidance
mens rea requirement into federal securities law, the reach of the respective
statutes would be sufficient to indict Cohen and likely hold him liable.
Under section 78ff(a) of the Exchange Act, a person is held liable for
securities fraud when that person “willfully and knowingly makes, or
causes to be made,” any statement to be filed with respect to securities
exchanges.208
Liability for insider trading is codified under section 78j of the
Exchange Act, in which one directly “effect[s] a short sale” or “stop-loss
order” or uses “any manipulative or deceptive device[s]” with the purchase
or sale of a security and violates the Exchange Act.209 If section 78ff(a)
added the language “or deliberately ignores”210 or “or willfully blinds” to
supplement the knowledge requirement, it would serve to reach corporate
individuals like Cohen who avert their eyes to misconduct. As noted by the
indictment, Cohen “fostered a culture that focused on not discussing
[i]nside [i]nformation too openly, rather than not seeking or trading on such
information in the first place.”211 Aside from ignoring the inherently cryptic
sources that both Horvath and Martoma used in their respective trading
recommendations for Dell 212 and Wyeth, 213 Cohen used tactics such as
diverting or not responding to communications containing suspicious
information.214
The benefits of applying the willful blindness doctrine to federal
securities law are readily apparent. By prohibiting principals from
deliberately avoiding the trading misconduct of their employees, the willful
blindness doctrine would serve as a less restrictive evidentiary burden and
207. Id. at 704 n.19 (citing United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972), which
noted that the purpose of deliberate ignorance is “to prevent an individual . . . from circumventing
criminal sanctions merely by deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging
in unlawful conduct.”).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
209. Id. §§ 78j(a)(1), (b).
210. This is an adoption of the “deliberate ignorance” instruction discussed by the Ninth Circuit
in Jewell. See generally Jewell, 532 F.2d.
211. Sealed Indictment, supra note 7, para. 23.
212. Id. paras. 21b, 32a.
213. Id. paras. 21d–e.
214. In one instance, Cohen did not respond to an email in which a SAC PM implied he
received inside information and in turn would short Nokia stock. In another, Cohen responded
“[l]et’s talk later” to an employee who claimed confidence in a company’s quarterly performance
in lieu of meeting with a company insider. Id. paras. 21a, 23.
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an impetus in self-regulation. The presence of the willful blindness doctrine
would likely motivate Cohen himself to ensure a more stringent compliance
department 215 and more effective due diligence investigations in
employment216 to correct his hedge fund’s “institutional indifference” to
insider trading.
Despite the benefit of imposing more of a threat of criminal liability on
principals, the presence of the willful blindness doctrine in federal securities
law would create both judicial and practical problems. The Supreme Court
has never specified the scienter requirement for holding someone criminally
liable for securities fraud. The lower federal courts have rendered a varied
array of opinions that make an interpretive mess of the mens rea required
for securities crimes.217 These results have ranged from willfulness with
awareness of a wrongful act, 218 to specific intent to defraud with the
knowledge or willful blindness to its falsity,219 or even as far as specific
intent to defraud while acting recklessly, with an undefined meaning of
recklessness.220 While scholars have argued that clarity needs to be made of
this interpretive disorder,221 defining the mens rea in specific terms such as
“willful blindness” is at odds with the need for flexibility in the law of
fraud. 222 In turn, there is a grave risk in defining securities fraud too
rigidly.223
In addition, this newfound presence of vicarious liability for
consciously avoiding securities violations places an impractical burden on
principals moving forward. While self-regulation would be a potential goal
215. From a limited number of S.A.C. Capital’s compliance department’s internal
investigations, it was merely confirmed that suspicious language in correspondence was merely
“inartfully drafted.” Id. para. 28.
216. The due diligence process made no reference to ethics, integrity, compliance or the
candidate’s tendency to make trades on inside information. Id. para. 18.
217. See Michael L. Siegel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related
Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1590–98 (2006) (analyzing several cases to convey the
inconsistencies between federal courts in defining “willfulness” in federal securities law).
218. United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 567–70 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Reyes, 577
F.3d 1069, 1079–80 (9thCir. 2009); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1970).
219. United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 469–70 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Mackay,
491 F.2d 616, 623 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 363–64 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862–63 (2d Cir. 1964).
220. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188–89, 1189 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1501–02 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Farris, 614 F.2d 634, 638
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Henderson, 446 F.2d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 1971); Elbel v. United
States, 364 F.2d 127, 133–34 (10th Cir. 1966).
221. See generally Siegel, supra note 217 (arguing for the coherence of mens rea analysis by
means of a clear understanding of the choices in criminal securities law violations).
222. Buell, supra note 12, at 520 (noting that fraud involves misconduct that “is characterized
by inventiveness.”). See also Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,
1972 (2006) (“Instability in the law of fraud is structural.”).
223. If fraud is narrowly defined to specific behaviors, new behaviors will arise that will expose
the flaws in the statutory construction. Buell, supra note 12, at 520.
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of this new doctrine,224 it may keep principals from their other corporate
responsibilities, including making a profit for shareholders.225 If corporate
principals seek to prevent themselves from being willfully blind to a
potential regulation, they will likely adhere to the “disclose or abstain”
rule.226 Over-disclosure would appear to be at odds with the general premise
that the public isn’t entitled to free flowing material public information
within the securities markets.227Abstaining from trading on any risky tip
would impede the incentive to use efficient trading strategies such as the
mosaic theory of trading.228
In addition, a more risk-adverse investment firm or hedge fund would
stand to lose investors due to an overly cautious approach in developing a
profitable mosaic of non-public and public information. The willful
blindness doctrine may bring a regime of deterrence in securities law that
the general public would seek, but without a more flexible approach to
imposing the threat of criminal liability on principals, both judicial and
practical conflicts render the doctrine impractical.
V. AN INDUSTRY SPECIFIC STATUTE
The respective applications of both strict liability and a heightened
mens rea requirement for principals in securities fraud and insider trading
regulation have illustrated doctrinal and practical conflicts. As previously
noted, it would eventually be rendered outdated by the ever-evolving
concept of fraud or result in hyper-deterrent regulation that would infringe
upon the very incentive of gaining informational advantages. The law may
need to reach principals like Cohen who carefully veil their misconduct, but
also needs to be flexibile so as to ensure that the principal’s indirect
operation of a proper and efficient oversight system through subordinates
will not result in criminal liability. Despite the individual flaws of both the
RCO and willful blindness doctrines, pulling elements from each doctrine
can form a practical statutory proposal. To address the fear of sweeping
change across all federal securities fraud, an industry specific statute
224. See Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 361 (2010) (“We
find that organizations are more likely to follow through on their commitments to self-regulate
when they (and their competitors) are subject to heavy regulatory surveillance and when they
adopt self-regulation in the absence of an explicit threat of sanctions.”).
225. This would also cause controversy by extending the duties of officers to shareholders. See
United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that a duty to disclose under
Rule 10b-5 is not derived from an executive’s fiduciary relationship to shareholders).
226. That is, by disclosing the inside information to the counterparty if they seek to trade or
abstain from trading at all, there is no deception. Buell, supra note 12, at 562.
227. Id. (stating that diligent traders should be encouraged and rewarded).
228. Cf. id. at 569 (noting that disclosure regulation seeks to make markets attractive by
streaming efficient information and protecting investors).
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regulating only principals of hedge funds, investment banks and brokerage
firms may be in order.229
In creating this industry-specific statute, the statutory construction
would follow the language of sections 78ff(a) of the Exchange Act. Thus,
the proposed language under 78ff(a) would be when a principal, “willfully
and knowingly or by deliberate avoidance makes, or causes to be made,”
any fraudulent securities exchanges. In addition, liability under a modified
section 78j would reflect principal liability for those who “effect a short sale
or to use or employ any stop-loss order” or “to use or employ any stop-loss
order.” Under section 78ff(a) of the Exchange Act, a person is held liable
for securities fraud when that person “willfully and knowingly makes, or
causes to be made,” any statement to be filed with respect to securities
exchanges.230 One might wonder where protection from liability may arise,
but the answer can be found in an inverse of the language derived from the
RCO doctrine. If an exception were added to exempt a principal’s inaction
in preventing a securities fraud or insider trading violation where the
misconduct, it would be in circumstances where the principal had no
responsible relation or authority to prevent the misconduct from occurring.
The exception would read: “A principal’s failure to prevent the offense
is exempted, when, by reason of his position in the corporation, they had no
responsibility and authority to prevent . . . or promptly to correct, the
violation complained of.”231 Although a marriage between two different
doctrines of criminal law, there have been cases that have applied the RCO
doctrine to statutes with mens rea requirements. 232 In addition, the
implementation of a “responsible relation” standard to a culpability
requirement would allow the RCO doctrine to function as intended outside
the realm of strict liability—to isolate meaningful contact with misconduct,
as a principal in a large corporation can seek to minimize the appearance of
such contact with minimal evidence of communication. 233 In turn, if a
229. Industry specific regulation of principals is not unheard of in this day and age. The
“Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act” seeks to “target top
brass at firms that come under scrutiny for their anti-money laundering controls.” See Rachel
Louise Ensign & Michael R. Crittenden, New Anti-Money Laundering Bill Targets Bank
Executives, WALL ST. J.COM (Oct 23, 2013, 1:36 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/10/23/new-anti-money-laundering-bill-targets-
bank-executives/.
230. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
231. This modification of the RCO doctrine’s “responsible relation” requirement is adopted
from the Supreme Court’s creation in Park of the three elements for liability. United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671–72 (1975).
232. See United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the RCO doctrine
and convicting the president of a chemical company for violations of the Clean Water Act, in
which actors are prohibited from “knowing” releases of pollutants into protected waters).
233. See Amad Kushner, Comment, Applying The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
Outside the Public Welfare Context, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 697 (2003) (arguing
that the RCO doctrine should be reevaluated as a general theory of criminal liability of corporate
officers).
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principal were to ensure and efficiently delegate a strong compliance and
disclosure program where subordinates are properly monitored, a
principal’s inaction to prevent a securities law violation would be
absolved.234 Ultimately, the combination of elements from both the RCO
doctrine and the willful blindness doctrine in constructing an industry-
specific statute serves to impose a threat of criminal liability on principals
for the misconduct of their company’s subordinates while leaving enough
flexibility for rationalized oversight and regulation.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception, federal securities law has failed to reach corporate
principals and impose criminal liability. Much of this is attributed to the
legislative intent of keeping criminal fraud a morality-based crime that
requires purposeful deceit.235 In addition, federal securities law needs to
stay flexible to combat the inventive means of those who commit securities
fraud and insider trading. 236 In turn, it is difficult to hold someone
vicariously liable for these crimes without evidence of a purpose to defraud.
The analysis of the RCO doctrine shows that while it would impose
vicarious liability for principals who are in a “responsible relation” to
misconduct, the presence of strict liability in the doctrine causes some
doctrinal problems to arise.237 In addition, the willful blindness doctrine
would impose a wider degree of culpability for securities violations.
Conversely, the windfall of its adoption would result in either new schemes
that render the mens rea as under-inclusive or alternatively, hyper-deterrent
resulting in over-disclosure in securities markets.238
Taking into account those limitations, an industry-specific statutory
construction targeting securities firms that incorporates language from both
the RCO doctrine and the willful blindness doctrine may provide enough
flexibility to ensure both deterrence and reasonable self-regulation.239 While
this statutory construction may be subject to amendment as new fraud
schemes arise, the current lack of accountability of principals who blind
themselves to corporate misconduct has created public unrest. 240 Until
people like Cohen are held accountable, securities markets will be
vulnerable to future securities fraud and insider trading schemes, which
234. This is consistent with the result of Park, where the Supreme Court found liability in part
because Park knew that he delegated unreliable subordinates to correct the rat infestation. Park,
421 U.S. at 677–78.
235. Buell, supra note 12, at 526–29.
236. Id. at 520 (noting that fraud involves misconduct that “is characterized by inventiveness.”).
237. See supra Part III. B.
238. See supra Part IV. B.
239. See supra Part V.
240. Cox, supra note 11 (“If you give people a blank check and tell them they have a get-out-
of-jail-free card because of their size . . .that’s a very dangerous thing.”).
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may ultimately led to a lemons market, and thus, an economy that will
struggle from a dearth of investor participation.241
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note 12, at 569.
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